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Legislative Coalition Size and  
Antigovernment Protests in Latin America 
Ana Isabel López García 
Abstract: This work examines whether the size, as well as the composi-
tion, of legislative coalitions is an additional factor that affects the inci-
dence of protests against national governments in Latin America. Based 
on aggregate data for 18 democracies from 1980 to 2014, the analysis 
reveals that the relationship between the size of legislative coalitions in 
the lower house of national assemblies and the odds of antigovernment 
protests is U-shaped. Specifically, the odds of antigovernment protests 
occurring decrease until the president has a coalition comprising 50–55 
percent of the national assembly; once this threshold is passed, the odds 
of protests taking place increase as the coalition grows. This result holds 
after controlling for the party composition of the governing coalition 
and other factors previously linked to the occurrence of antigovernment 
protests. The evidence thus indicates that both minority and supermajor-
ity scenarios can be socially destabilizing for Latin American democra-
cies.  
  Manuscript received 24 June 2016; accepted 18 September 2017 
Keywords: Latin America, executive–legislative relations, presidential-
ism, political participation, antigovernment protests 
Ana Isabel López García is an assistant professor at El Colegio de la 
Frontera Norte (COLEF) in Tijuana, Mexico, and a visiting research 
fellow at the GIGA German Institute of Global and Area Studies, Insti-
tute of Latin American Studies (ILAS), in Hamburg, Germany. 
E-mail: <aigarcia@colef.mx>; <ana.lopez@giga-hamburg.de> 
  
  92 Ana Isabel López García 
 
Introduction 
Due to the “dual mandate” problem between the executive and the legis-
lature, presidential systems are more prone to suffer from breakdowns 
than are parliamentary systems (Stepan and Skach 1993; Cheibub 2002; 
Cheibub and Limongi 2002; Cheibub, Przeworski, and Saiegh 2004). 
Despite this, democratic politics has proved enduring in third-wave Latin 
America, where majority governments are now the norm rather than the 
exception (Chasquetti 2001; Deheza 1997; Foweraker 1998; Cheibub, 
Przeworski, and Saiegh 2004; Cheibub 2002). In fact, no third-wave 
democracy in the region (except for Ecuador) has had an average legisla-
tive coalition size of less than 45 percent (the minimum for a working 
majority) in the lower house of its national legislature (Table 1). Never-
theless, despite increasing cooperation between executives and legisla-
tures in the region, Latin American democracies continue to be beset by 
waves of antigovernment protests (Figure 1).  
Of course, the incidence of antigovernment protests in the region 
can be attributed to a myriad of factors, including the rise of social media 
(Salzman 2015), the influence of external actors (Trejo 2013), the re-
gion’s mode of insertion into the global economy and the effects of 
neoliberal reforms (Arce and Bellinger 2007; Arce 2008; Arce and Rice 
2009; Stahler-Sholk, Vanden, and Kuecker 2008; Almeida 2010), the 
persistence of structural inequalities (including the unequal distribution 
of land) (Foweraker 1995; Davis 1999; Foweraker and Krznaric 2002; 
Landman and Larizza 2009), and the continued marginalization of ethnic 
and racial groups (Yashar 2005; Lucero 2008).  
Table 1.  Legislative Coalitions in the Lower Houses of the National Legis-
latures of Latin American Democracies (Mean Values), 1982–
2012  
Country Number of 
parties com-
posing the 
coalition 
Fraction of 
seats held by 
the presiden-
tial party 
Fraction of 
seats held 
by the 
coalition 
Relative size 
of the presi-
dential party 
within the 
coalition 
Argentina 1.26 0.47 0.51 0.94 
Bolivia 1.97 0.41 0.59 0.72 
Brazil 5.97 0.25 0.66 0.39 
Chile 3.80 0.23 0.55 0.41 
Colombia 2.23 0.41 0.67 0.65 
Costa Rica 1.23 0.47 0.50 0.95 
Dominican 
Republic 1.17 0.47 0.48 0.98 
Ecuador 1.89 0.24 0.34 0.65 
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Country Number of 
parties com-
posing the 
coalition 
Fraction of 
seats held by 
the presiden-
tial party 
Fraction of 
seats held 
by the 
coalition 
Relative size 
of the presi-
dential party 
within the 
coalition 
El Salvador 1.61 0.41 0.46 0.91 
Guatemala 1.76 0.42 0.54 0.80 
Honduras 1.03 0.52 0.52 1.00 
Mexico 1.10 0.42 0.43 0.99 
Nicaragua 1.00 0.57 0.57 1.00 
Panama 3.65 0.43 0.61 0.75 
Paraguay 1.38 0.46 0.52 0.85 
Peru 1.61 0.47 0.53 0.93 
Uruguay 1.50 0.42 0.61 0.75 
Venezuela 1.74 0.51 0.56 0.94 
Region 1.26 0.47 0.51 0.94 
Source:  World Bank (2015); Payne, Zovatto, and Mateo Díaz (2006) and Georgetown 
University (2012). 
In effect, the identity and the demands of social movement actors vary 
greatly across time and space in third-wave Latin America. What charac-
terizes all these disparate movements is their demand for changes to the 
way political power is structured and exercised in their countries 
(Foweraker and Landman 1997; Tilly 1978).  
Figure 1. Antigovernment Protests in Latin American Democracies,  
1980–2014 
  
 
Source: GDELT (2014). 
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In presidential systems, like those in Latin America, the executive is the 
focal point of politics and policymaking and therefore of contentious 
action.1 Yet, save for a few classic presidentialism works relating minority 
governments to episodes of social instability (Linz and Valenzuela 1994; 
Mainwaring 1993), the relationship between presidentialism and the 
political attitudes and behavior of citizens has received little scholarly 
attention (Saiegh 2011; 2015; Carreras forthcoming; Singh and Carlin 
2015). This work aims to contribute to a growing body of literature that 
connects the institutional and behavioral aspects of democracies. It does 
so by examining whether, and in what ways, the size and composition of 
legislative coalitions in assemblies influence the incidence of antigov-
ernment protests in Latin America. Within the region, there is consider-
able variation in both the trajectory of antigovernment protests and the 
character of executive–legislative relations across time and space, making 
it possible to examine this relationship from a comparative perspective 
(Figures 2 and 3).  
Figure 2. Antigovernment Protests in Latin America by Country  
(1980–2014) 
Source:  GDELT (2014). 
                                                 
1  According to data from the Global Data on Events, Location and Tone 
(GDELT) dataset, 26 percent of all protest events in Latin America between 
1980 and 2012 targeted national state institutions. Of these, 60 percent targeted 
the national executive.  
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Figure 3. Antigovernment Protests in Latin America by Country  
(1980–2014) 
 
Source:  GDELT (2014). 
To be clear, the objective of this paper is not to provide a full explana-
tion of the occurrence of antigovernment protests across the region but 
rather to identify an additional factor behind this phenomenon.  
The basic proposition advanced here is that the relationship be-
tween the occurrence of antigovernment protests and the size of a legis-
lative coalition in a national assembly is U-shaped. In other words, I 
expect protests against the national government to be more likely to 
occur if presidents are supported in their respective assemblies by either 
a minority or an oversized majority. This claim is tested using aggregate 
data for 18 Latin America democracies for the period 1980–2014. As 
hypothesized, the statistical results indicate that the relationship between 
presidential coalition size and the rate of antigovernment protests is U-
shaped. Specifically, the probability of antigovernment protests decreases 
up to the point that the legislative coalition comprises 50–55 percent of 
the assembly; after this threshold is passed, the likelihood of protests 
increases as the coalition grows. This result holds after controlling for 
the governing coalition’s party composition and other factors previously 
linked to the incidence of antigovernment protests. The evidence thus 
suggests that both minority and supermajority scenarios can socially 
destabilize governments in presidential systems.  
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The study proceeds as follows: It begins by discussing the existing 
literature on presidentialism because it relates to the occurrence of an-
tigovernment protests. Next, it advances a series of hypotheses on the 
effect of the size and status of legislative coalitions on the incidence of 
antigovernment protests in presidential democracies. It then describes 
the data and methods that are used for testing these claims. It presents 
the results through a series of statistical models before concluding with a 
discussion on the empirical findings and some recommendations for 
future research. 
1 Theory 
According to relative deprivation theories, contentious action is more 
likely to occur when individuals feel aggrieved – that is, whenever their 
current situation does not match the conditions of life to which they feel 
rightfully entitled (Gurr 1970: 13; Muller and Weede 1994: 41). In every 
democracy all citizens should have equal rights, at least with regard to 
political contestation and participation (Dahl 1971: 6–7). When the rights 
that people have in theory do not match the rights they enjoy in practice 
(Foweraker and Landman 1997) – as is the case in most of Latin Ameri-
ca – citizens have strong incentives to protest against their governments 
(Foweraker 1995). In other words, the incidence of antigovernment 
protests is related to the extent to which the process and outcomes of 
policymaking are in line with citizens’ rights. It follows that the occur-
rence of antigovernment protests is influenced by the decision-making 
process and, therefore, the high politics of legislative coalition-building.  
Citizenship rights are the political mainstay of a democratic system; 
the extent to which they are effectively enforced throughout the demos 
constitutes the core of democratic governability. Although governability 
issues in Latin America have long been related to the character of execu-
tive–legislative relations (Linz 1994; Mainwaring 1993), most scholarship 
on Latin American presidentialism treats antigovernment protests as an 
exogenous variable that affects (rather than reflects) the ways in which 
presidents relate to parties in their respective national assemblies. Ac-
cording to some accounts, presidential interruptions in the region are 
shaped by the occurrence of street protests in conjunction with other 
factors, such as splits in the ruling coalition, minority presidencies, or 
economic downturns (Marsteintredet and Berntzen 2008; Llanos and 
Mainstentredet 2010; Hochstetler 2006; Pérez Liñán 2008). Other studies 
relate the incidence of minister turnovers to unexpected shocks, such as 
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street protests, media scandals, economic crises, or natural disasters 
(Camerlo and Pérez-Liñán 2013; Martínez-Gallardo 2014).  
Although the above arguments are valid, I argue that the occurrence 
of antigovernment protests can also be shaped by the character of execu-
tive–legislative relations. The connection between the occurrence of 
antigovernment protests and the character of executive–legislative rela-
tions is the policymaking process, which is conditioned by the relative 
powers of the presidency and the legislature and, therefore, the distribu-
tion of presidential support in the national assembly. In a presidential 
democracy both the president and legislators are elected with the man-
date to represent the interests of their constituents in the policymaking 
process. Thus, I expect the likelihood of antigovernment protests to be 
higher if a president (1) lacks a working majority or (2) is supported by 
an oversized coalition in the national assembly. In other words, I expect 
the incidence of antigovernment protests to be nonlinearly related to 
legislative coalition size.  
If a president lacks a working majority in their assembly, levels of 
antigovernment protests can escalate due to policy paralysis and, in turn, 
the inability of the government to deliver outputs that benefit citizens’ 
rights at large. Certainly, minority presidents can advance their agendas 
through executive orders, regulatory ordinances, and decree powers, 
provided that they have this constitutional prerogative. However, the 
legitimacy of such enacted laws may be questioned by other parties in the 
assemblies, which may feel they have been left out of the policymaking 
process and, if able, may overturn those presidential actions.2 Opposition 
parties can exercise their right to participate in the policymaking process 
by organizing themselves to remove the president or by joining or organ-
izing demonstrations against the national executive. Policy paralysis and 
attempts to unilaterally resolve it can fuel anger and frustration among 
citizens and ultimately increase their incentives to protest against the 
authorities.  
Gridlock is avoided when presidents count on the support of large 
majorities in their national assemblies. Majority coalitions can be com-
posed of either a single party or various parties. The problem with single-
party supermajorities is that they allow presidents to govern as they see 
fit (O’Donnell 1994). In such scenarios legislatures merely serve to rub-
ber stamp the presidential actions of presidents who are free to abuse 
their positions, change the rules of the democratic game for their own 
benefit, co-opt autonomous institutions like the judiciary, and censure 
                                                 
2  Presidential decrees can also be subjected to judicial review. 
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and persecute dissidents, and so on and so forth (Corrales and Penfold 
2011: 156–157; Negretto 2013; Levitsky and Loxton 2013). There is the 
risk that the process and outcomes of policymaking seek not to include 
but to exclude opposition elements. Therefore, the lack of oversight of 
the executive can have a deleterious impact on the allocation and com-
position of public spending, the delivery of public services and goods, 
and, consequently, the enforcement of citizenship rights. Those citizens 
and political actors left out of the decision-making process and/or di-
rectly harmed by the actions of delegative presidents may resort to pro-
test to defend their entitlements. To put it differently, executives that are 
not subject to adequate restraints may adopt biased policy, which could 
spark intense public indignation and push citizens to protest against the 
government.  
For instance, following the collapse of traditional parties in Vene-
zuela, the legislature came under the absolute control of the governing 
party: the United Socialist Party of Venezuela (Partido Socialista Unido 
de Venezuela, PSUV). Consequently, President Hugo Chávez was virtu-
ally free to push through legislation on a wide range of issues according 
to his personal preferences.3 Under Chávez, policies were formulated 
(sometimes from one day to the next) and implemented without any 
scrutiny or deliberation of any kind from the opposition. Also, cabinet 
positions were reserved for the president’s cronies. Although Chávez 
endorsed a redistributive agenda, his policy outcomes were neither redis-
tributive nor sustainable in the economic arena (Corrales 2011: 85). 
Moreover, once Chávez took control of the courts, the electoral institu-
tions, and the security apparatus, the civil and political freedoms of ordi-
nary Venezuelan citizens became more restricted. In 2007 the private 
media and students began to mobilize against human rights violations, 
growing crime, and increasingly evident government corruption 
(Corrales 2011: 85; Levitsky and Loxton 2013: 124–125). Over time, an 
important number of former Chávez supporters (among the country’s 
middle class and urban poor) joined the ranks of protesters to object to 
the deterioration of protection afforded to political, civil, and social 
rights (Canache 2004: 46–48; Corrales and Penfold 2011: 146–148; 
Corrales 2003).4 In Chávez’s Venezuela protest levels experienced an 
                                                 
3  Most legislation during Chávez’s government, however, was enacted by dele-
gated decree authority (DDA). DDA laws were approved by the legislature in 
favor of the president in 1999, 2000, and 2007. In 2007 DDA was granted to 
the president for a period of 18 months. 
4  Defections also occurred within the cabinet, allied parties, and the military 
(Corrales 2011: 72–74).  
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upward trajectory (Corrales 2011: 82–83) (see Figure 3). This case illus-
trates that protests can arise even when the government’s legislative 
passage rates are high. This is because executives with increased powers 
and greater legislative capacity can actually lead to political polarization, 
social instability, a loss of system legitimacy.  
Certainly, oversized coalitions reduce the likelihood of interbranch 
conflict and, more importantly, prevent the executive from bypassing the 
legislature or transgressing the constitutional order. This is because coali-
tion partners act as veto players in both the cabinet and the coalition. At 
the same time, plural coalitions can provide nonincumbent parties with 
greater opportunities to influence the formulation and implementation 
of policies. Thus, one might assume that the probability of protest is 
lower when presidents are supported by plural coalitions than by single-
party coalitions. This would be in keeping with the idea that antigovern-
ment protests are less likely to occur in consociational democracies, 
which are characterized by the accommodation of a number of interests 
in government (Lijphart 1977: 25–47; 1969: 216). However, the idea of 
consociationalism is based on the experience of established democracies 
of the West.  
Nonetheless, various studies on Latin America indicate that large 
plural coalition governments have pernicious effects on the equal appli-
cation of the rule of law and the equal enforcement of citizenship rights 
(Foweraker and Krznaric 2002; Foweraker 1998; Hagopian 1990). Due 
to the unequal structure of societies in the region, large coalitions com-
monly involve pacts with traditional oligarchies and therefore policy 
choices are narrow. By virtue of these alliances, questions of wealth re-
distribution (e.g., agrarian reform and progressive taxation policies) – 
which impair the delivery of public goods and the protection of citizen-
ship rights – are left off the political agenda. Similarly, rights abuses 
committed by oligarchies (e.g., modern forms of slavery and coercive 
labor, clientelism, corruption, and unequal access to law) are tolerated in 
exchange for legislative votes. For example, Alfred Montero (2014: ch. 4) 
notes that while large coalition governments served to advance the pas-
sage of legislation in third-wave Brazil, in the long run such pacts also 
played a key role in weakening relevant accountability institutions, par-
ticularly congressional investigative committees. Hence, although large 
plural coalition pacts might enable presidents to advance their agendas 
and prevent the rise of “delegative presidencies,” they can also increase 
the incentive to protest against the government among those most af-
fected by the abuse of traditional elites.  
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An additional reason has to do with the way oversized legislative 
pacts are sustained over time. Presidents negotiate coalitions with other 
parties on the basis of cabinet representation, policy concessions, agen-
da-setting powers, and so on and so forth. However, due to the separa-
tion of the executive and the legislative, there is no guarantee that presi-
dents can count on the support of individual legislators from parties 
represented in their cabinets, not even of those from their own party. 
But congress members can switch to the opposition at any moment 
without being held responsible for the failures of the government. Cabi-
net allocations are thus insufficient for crafting and preserving large 
coalitions in multiparty presidential democracies (Raile, Pereira, and 
Power 2010). Presidents have strong incentives to offer (mainly through 
budgetary decisions) covert payments or benefits on an ongoing basis to 
legislators in return for their support; whereas legislators have strong 
incentives to continuously threaten not to support any government initi-
atives in order to extort additional favors or resources from the president 
(Raile, Pereira, and Power 2010).5  
Obviously, the larger the coalition, the more pork that is required. 
Of course, one could argue that the pay-offs that coalition partners get 
from the president could be used to provide material benefits to local 
constituencies and consequently improve political representation.6 How-
ever, the resources used to finance these side payments are commonly 
disbursed in covert or hidden ways and are therefore used for private 
(not public) purposes, to the detriment of citizenship rights (Mejía 
Acosta 2006; Mejía Acosta and Polga-Hecimovich 2011). Hence, alt-
hough oversized coalitions can effectively reduce hyperpresidential 
tendencies, they do not minimize the risk of state abuse by coalition 
partners or, therefore, the likelihood of antigovernment protests. But, 
they can lead to the destabilization and delegitimization of the political 
system overall. 
For instance, since 1994, Brazilian presidents have managed to in-
clude over eight parties in the cabinet and have commanded large ma-
                                                 
5  Not all the currencies that are available to a president to forge broad coalitions 
in the national assembly necessarily involve corruption (Helmke and Levitsky 
2006). Nonetheless, coalitions sustained by tools other than pork tend to be the 
exception rather than the rule. In fact, existing research demonstrates that mal-
feasance is more likely to occur in presidential democracies than in other sys-
tems (Lederman, Loayza, and Soares 2005). 
6  That said, these benefits are often delivered in exchange for electoral support. 
Clientelism is exclusionary by nature and consequently inimical to democratic 
representation and the equal enforcement of citizenship rights.  
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jorities. Coalitions during that time have comprised more than 12 parties 
and have accounted for 70 percent of the seats in the lower house of the 
National Congress. These majorities have enabled presidents to pass 
legislation and implement successful redistributive programs like Bolsa 
Familia. For years, improvements in governability in Brazil had been 
attributed to this type of coalitional presidentialism (See Montero 2004, 
Ch. 1). However, as coalitional politics progressed, protests against the 
national government (e.g., denouncing the low quality of social service 
provisions, the high cost of living, police brutality, the homicide rate, and 
even political corruption) began to mount (Winters and Weitz-Shapiro 
2015). Over time, the country has witnessed a series of scandals, which 
have exposed the bribery, money laundering, and misuse of public funds 
that underpins plural coalitions in Congress. The most infamous was the 
Mensalão scandal in 2005, which exposed how the governing Workers’ 
Party (Partido dos Trabalhadores, PT) misused public resources to make 
monthly side payments to legislators in return for their support for the 
president’s agenda.7 What is interesting about the case of Brazil is that 
antigovernment protests were on an upward trajectory long before the 
end of the commodity boom and the country entered its worst recession 
ever (Figure 2). Thus, I argue that the incidence of antigovernment pro-
tests is not so much influenced by legislative coalitions’ party composi-
tion as it is by their size. But, greater cooperation and trust within politi-
cal elites can lead to a marked deterioration of citizens’ trust in the gov-
ernment and political institutions and in their ability to protect their 
rights.  
When presidents have the support of a working (nonoversized) ma-
jority in the national assembly, the risk of legislative paralysis is lower 
than under minority governments since the president has enough sup-
port to advance the government’s basic agenda. However, presidents 
cannot minimize the claims and interests of opposition parties, particu-
larly if major reforms are on the agenda. At the same time, the opposi-
tion still has enough capacity to block the proposals, to check on the 
actions of the executive, and to consequently prevent abuses and rent 
extraction by the president (and the president’s allies in government). Of 
course, legislative passage rates are higher for presidents with oversized 
majorities. But, it is more likely that laws enacted under governments not 
backed by oversized coalitions will be more inclusive and more in line 
                                                 
7  It should be noticed that the disclosure of these scandals was made possible by 
the resilience of control institutions like the Federal Police (Polícia Federal), the 
Public Prosecutor's Office (Ministério Público), and other independent comp-
troller agencies in the country.  
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with citizens’ rights. Additionally, highly charged policy conflicts will be 
resolved through compromise and accommodation. Obviously, this does 
not mean that state abuse is nonexistent under such governments; rather 
its consequences might not be as dire as they would be under a govern-
ment supported by an oversized coalition. Hence, I expect the relation-
ship between legislative coalition size and the incidence of antigovern-
ment protests to be U-shaped.  
These ideas are consistent with previous findings. For instance, 
Singh and Carlin (2015), who use survey data from 18 Latin American 
countries, show that there is a nonlinear relationship between citizens’ 
levels of support for and satisfaction with democracy and the lawmaking 
powers of presidents. Accordingly, citizens are unhappiest about democ-
racy when their presidents are the strongest or weakest in terms of law-
making powers (measured as formal powers, partisan powers, and rate of 
statutory success). Using aggregate data from all countries, Sebastian 
Saeigh (2011: ch. 9; 2015) likewise demonstrates that the odds of social 
unrest and governments’ legislative passage rates are nonlinearly related. 
Accordingly, the risk of social protest should be highest when passage 
rates are (1) extremely low due to a stalemate or (2) extremely high be-
cause there is little room for the opposition to check executive actions or 
block executive proposals. Following Saiegh (2011; 2015), governments 
with legislative rates above 85 percent are more prone to experience 
social upheaval than are those with lower legislative rates (below 15 per-
cent). Saeigh (2015) also indicates that governments’ legislative passage 
rates are lower under coalition governments than under single-party 
governments.  
If governments’ legislative passage rates are nonlinearly influenced 
by the size of legislative coalitions, the occurrence of antigovernment 
protests might reasonably be expected to be nonlinearly affected as well. 
Thus, I expect antigovernment protests to be more likely to occur when 
presidents command either a minority or an oversized majority in their 
respective assemblies. Based on these considerations, I advance the fol-
lowing hypotheses:  
H1: The size of the legislative coalition affects the incidence of antigovern-
ment protests.  
H2: There is a U-shaped relationship between legislative coalition size 
and the likelihood of antigovernment protests.  
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2 Data and Methods 
To address the above claims, this paper uses a cross-national quantitative 
analysis based on aggregate data for 18 Latin American democracies for 
the period 1982–2012.8  
2.1 Dependent Variable 
The dependent variable is the incidence of antigovernment protests. It is 
measured by the number of protest events (including demonstrations 
and rallies, hunger strikes, blockades, strikes and boycotts, and riots) 
against the national executive occurring in a country in a given year. Data 
for this variable were obtained from the GDELT.9 This dataset allows us 
to distinguish events according to the occurrence and targets of conten-
tious action. It is based on reports from various international news 
sources, including Agence France Presse, the Associated Press Online, Associated 
Press Worldstream, BBC Monitoring, the Christian Science Monitor, Facts on File, 
the Foreign Broadcast Information Service, United Press International, the Washing-
ton Post, the New York Times, and all national and international news from 
Google News. It should be noted that Google News records information 
from historical archives dating back over 200 years. Thus, this data 
source is likely to produce a more reliable measure of protest events than 
the Cross-National Time-Series Data Archive, which despite being the most 
commonly used source of protest events among scholars, presents vari-
ous biases as it is based on only one news source from one country: the 
New York Times.  
2.2  Independent Variables 
The key explanatory variables (see below) were collected from the Data-
base of Political Institutions (World Bank 2015) and Georgetown Universi-
ty’s Political Database of the Americas (2012). Additional or complementary 
information was gathered from news reports and government websites. 
                                                 
8  The sample includes the following countries: Argentina (1983), Bolivia (1982), 
Brazil (1985), Chile (1989), Colombia (1980), Costa Rica (1980), Ecuador 
(1982), Dominican Republic (1980), El Salvador (1984), Guatemala (1996), 
Honduras (1982), Mexico (1994), Nicaragua (1990), Panama (1989), Paraguay 
(1992), Peru (1982), Uruguay (1985), and Venezuela (1980).  
9  The GDELT data source covers all events worldwide since 1979. As the name 
of this data source suggests, events are distinguished according to the character 
of actors involved, the claims made, the forms of action, and the location of 
events.  
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Size of the presidential party is the share of seats held by the presi-
dent’s party in the lower house of the national legislature. If a president 
is not affiliated with any party, the size of the presidential party is 0. 
Size of the legislative coalition is the share of seats held by the pres-
ident’s party and the parties holding cabinet portfolios in the lower 
house of the national legislature.  
Relative size of the presidential party is the ratio between the legisla-
tive seats held by the presidential party and the total proportion of legis-
lative seats controlled by the parties in the governing coalition (i.e., those 
represented in the cabinet). This ratio varies from 0 to 1 and declines as 
the number of parties in the coalition grows (Morgenstern, Negri, and 
Pérez-Liñán 2008). 
Parties in government is the number of parties that compose the 
legislative coalition.  
2.3  Control Variables 
The following were also employed as independent variables:  
Time in office of the president is the number of years the president 
has been in power. It is included to control for the stage of the presiden-
tial term in which coalition arrangements and protests take place. All 
models include the logarithm of this variable.  
Reelected president is included as presidents or parties that are able 
to prolong their stay in office tend to develop formal and informal ad-
vantages over the opposition and also have more tools for building 
broad coalitions. This is a binary variable, coded 1 if the president is 
reelected and 0 otherwise. 
Presidential ideology is a series of binary variables indicating wheth-
er presidents implemented leftist, center-leftist, centrist, center-rightist, 
or rightist economic policies in government. It is included since left-wing 
presidents are more likely to favor income redistribution policies and 
have stronger links with some key protest organizers (mainly labor un-
ions and student associations). Data for this variable was obtained from 
the Latin American Electoral Dataset (1978–2009) (compiled by Virginia 
Oliveros, María Victoria Murillo, and Milan Vaishnav) and complement-
ed with additional information.  
Ideological polarization is measured as the ideological distance be-
tween the presidential party and the main opposition party in the legisla-
ture. It is included since ideological polarization can inhibit coalition 
building (Foweraker 1998). 
Lawmaking powers of presidents measures the concentration of 
presidential legislative powers as stipulated in a country’s constitution. 
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Specifically, it captures presidents’ veto powers, decree authority, budg-
etary powers, and referendum powers. It is included since presidents 
with broad constitutional powers have fewer incentives to build coali-
tions in national assemblies, appoint partisan members to their cabinets, 
or distribute portfolios in a proportional manner (Amorim Neto 2006). 
This index variable was developed by Gabriel Negretto (2014) and rang-
es from 1 to 100, with 100 being the maximum possible level of power. 
Bicameral structure of the national legislature is included since in 
bicameral legislatures there is the possibility that presidents may com-
mand a majority in one house but not in the other and may therefore be 
subjected to additional checks.10 This variable is coded 1 if the national 
legislature is bicameral and 0 otherwise (Payne, Zovatto, and Mateo Díaz 
2006). 
Other controls include socioeconomic and demographic factors 
that have previously been related to the incidence of protests against 
national governments in Latin America. These include population size, 
economic development levels, economic growth, inflation rate, income 
inequality, foreign investment, ethnic polarization, and Internet usage. I 
describe the measurement of these variables and discuss the theoretical 
bases of their inclusion in the Appendix.  
Since the number of observations varies with the availability of 
these control indicators over time, linear interpolation was computed for 
each country-series to increase the number of observations for the pre-
sent enquiry. Complete data is available for 478 country-year observa-
tions.  
Table 2 presents the summary statistics of all these variables.  
Table 2. Descriptive Statistics 
Statistic N Mean St. Dev. Min. Max. 
Number of protests against the 
national executive 630 12.71 38.55 0.00 766 
Legislative coalition size 547 0.54 0.17 0.01 1.00 
Size of presidential party with-
in the coalition  547 0.81 0.26 0.00 1.00 
Number of parties within the 
coalition  547 1.97 1.63 0.00 12.00 
                                                 
10  These may be due to variations in the system used to select upper-house mem-
bers. For instance, senators in Argentina, Brazil, Mexico (prior to 1997), Bolivia 
(until 2009), and Chile have the mandate to represent the interests of specific 
territorial units and are elected in uninominal districts. However, senators in 
Colombia, Paraguay, and Uruguay have the mandate to represent the interests 
of the electorate at large and are elected via proportional representation rules.  
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Statistic N Mean St. Dev. Min. Max.
Reelected president (binary) 561 0.10 0.30 0.00 1.00 
Years in office (log) 560 0.42 0.28 0.00 1.18 
Lawmaking powers of presi-
dents (index) 602 48.26 23.36 20.22 99.94
Upper house (binary) 561 0.53 0.50 0.00 1.00 
Ideological polarization 550 1.66 1.03 0.00 4.00 
Left and center-left presidents 
(binary) 560 0.27 0.44 0.00 1.00 
Internet users (per 1,000) 630 8.20 13.95 0.00 66.50
Income inequality (Gini index) 569 47.23 4.58 35.98 58.10
Population size (log) 630 7.07 0.50 6.29 8.31 
GDP per capita (log) 630 3.47 0.27 2.89 3.99 
GDP growth 630 3.19 4.33 -26.48 18.29
Inflation rate (log) 607 1.12 0.66 -0.72 4.13 
Foreign direct investment (% 
of GDP) 629 2.44 2.60 -12.21 17.13
Ethnic polarization (index) 629 0.64 0.19 0.28 0.96 
3 Estimation Strategy 
Because the number of protest events could only take integer and 
nonnegative values, the dependent variable could only be estimated using 
nonlinear models for count data. To correct for unit heterogeneity, an 
alternative is to employ a fixed-effects Poisson model or a negative bi-
nomial model. Nonetheless, these models are based on the assumption 
that the impact of the regressors on the dependent variable is static and 
therefore does not have any effect in future periods. Protest events, 
however, unfold in trends or cycles over time according to the accumula-
tion of unaddressed grievances and are consequently likely to be corre-
lated over time within a country. Therefore, using fixed-effects Poisson 
or negative binomial models is not an adequate strategy. Moreover, the 
addition of a lagged dependent variable (LDV) to the set of regressors 
could introduce a series of biases and discontinuities, because the LDV 
would be estimating a linear (not a nonlinear) exponential growth rate 
(Sutradhar 2011: 189–190).  
A more adequate strategy for estimating count data in a pooled 
cross-sectional time-series context is the so-called linear feedback model 
(LFM) (Blundell, Griffith, and Windmeijer 2002).11 In the LFM the LDV 
is linearly related to the dependent variable, but the other covariates 
                                                 
11  In the LFM, LDV is linearly related to the dependent variable, whereas the 
other covariates influence the outcome variable by an exponential function 
(Blundell, Griffith, and Windmeijer 2002; Trivedi and Munkin 2010). 
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influence the outcome variable by an exponential function (Blundell, 
Griffith, and Windmeijer 2002; Trivedi and Munkin 2010). In formal 
terms let be the number of protest events that occurred in the th 
  	
 
  country in the year  	
 
 .  is influenced by a -
dimensional vector of factors    
  
 
with a magnitude of 
   
  
 
  
 , and by th-country’s specific characteristics 
 . This dynamic relationship can be expressed as follows: 
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where  is the error for country  in year &.  
The estimation of this classic dynamic model requires “weak exogeneity” 
to be assumed. Therefore, this is not a true fixed-effects model. Howev-
er, it is possibly the most appropriate statistical dynamic specification for 
pooled cross-sectional time-series for count data available at the time of 
writing. The model parameters are estimated using the generalized meth-
od of moments (GMM) estimator (Wooldridge 2010: 764–766; Trivedi 
and Munkin 2010),12 while further overdispersion is controlled for using 
robust clustered estimators. 
All estimations were conducted using Stata 14. 
4 Results 
Table 3 presents the results of the statistical exercise. Unstandardized 
coefficients with robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. 
Parameter estimates are in log-odds units. As seen in model 2, there is a 
U-shaped relationship between the size of the legislative coalition and 
the odds of antigovernment protests. I set the regression equation to 
zero and solved it and found that the likelihood of antigovernment pro-
tests is lowest when the president has a coalition consisting of 51 percent 
of members in the national assembly. Once this threshold is surpassed, 
the odds of antigovernment protests rise as legislative coalition size in-
creases.  
  
                                                 
12  Because the functional form of the model does not belong to the exponential 
family, estimation via maximum likelihood estimates (MLE) is not feasible. 
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Table 3. Dynamic Linear Feedback Models 
 All countries 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Coalition size 0.253 -3.396*** 0.0108 
 (0.745) (0.878) (3.428) 
Relative size of presidential party  -0.442 -0.193 -0.526 
 (0.468) (0.548) (0.776) 
Number of coalition parties -0.140** -0.138** 0.163 
 (0.053) (0.051) (0.476) 
Coalition size (squared)  3.336*** -0.0154 
  (0.940) (3.586) 
Coalition size * Coalition parties   -1.500 
   (1.511) 
Coalition size (squared)*Coalition parties   1.396 
   (1.297) 
Coalition size*GDP growth    
    
Coalition size (squared)*GDP growth    
    
GDP growth -0.0627** -0.0638** -0.0628** 
 (0.024) (0.023) (0.021) 
Bicameral -0.287 -0.196 -0.172 
 (0.275) (0.257) (0.268) 
Ideological distance -0.105 -0.0971 -0.106 
 (0.102) (0.091) (0.090) 
Left and center-left presidents 0.355 0.409 0.409 
 (0.301) (0.307) (0.292) 
Reelected president 0.00809 0.0323 -0.0651 
 (0.185) (0.216) (0.270) 
Years in office (log) 0.206 0.143 0.114 
 (0.234) (0.222) (0.221) 
Presidential powers 0.00008 -0.00142 -0.0005 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Internet users (per 1m000) 0.0276*** 0.0307*** 0.0308*** 
 (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) 
Gini index -0.0724** -0.0579** -0.0656** 
 (0.022) (0.021) (0.024) 
Population size 1.618*** 1.657*** 1.727*** 
 (0.323) (0.332) (0.336) 
GDP per capita (log) -1.650*** -1.724*** -1.878*** 
 (0.482) (0.489) (0.494) 
Inflation (log) -0.527*** -0.505*** -0.513*** 
 (0.147) (0.133) (0.127) 
Foreign direct investment 0.130*** 0.141*** 0.145*** 
 (0.039) (0.037) (0.037) 
Ethnic polarization 0.483 0.371 0.353 
 (0.712) (0.684) (0.654) 
Number of observations 478 478 478 
Number of countries 18 18 18 
Rho 0.169+ 0.140 0.120 
Q 0.00513 0.00314 0.00516 
J 2.452 1.502 2.467 
Note:  Coefficients significant at + p<0.1, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001; coefficients 
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Table 3. (continued) 
 All countries All countries except Brazil 
 (4) (5) (6) 
Coalition size -1.750 -0.0535 -3.462** 
 (1.550) (0.577) (1.056) 
Relative size of presidential party  -0.195 -0.341 -0.132 
 (0.568) (0.688) (0.695) 
Number of coalition parties -0.132* 0.0368 0.0209 
 (0.053) (0.192) (0.148) 
Coalition size (squared) 2.408*  3.126*** 
 (1.028)  (0.810) 
Coalition size * Coalition parties    
    
Coalition size (squared)*Coalition parties    
    
Coalition size*GDP growth -0.388   
 (0.417)   
Coalition size (squared)*GDP growth 0.179   
 (0.357)   
GDP growth 0.0890 -0.056** -0.058** 
 (0.107) (0.021) (0.020) 
Bicameral -0.141 -0.267 -0.174 
 (0.267) (0.238) (0.246) 
Ideological distance -0.0934 -0.0584 -0.0473 
 (0.102) (0.110) (0.104) 
Left and center-left presidents 0.368 0.275 0.327 
 (0.312) (0.310) (0.314) 
Reelected president 0.0181 0.0257*** 0.0285*** 
 (0.218) (0.006) (0.006) 
Years in office (log) 0.112 0.141 0.170 
 (0.221) (0.198) (0.243) 
Presidential powers -0.0015 0.102 0.0508 
 (0.003) (0.222) (0.214) 
Internet users (per 1m000) 0.0298*** 0.000304 -0.0009 
 (0.007) (0.003) (0.003) 
Gini index -0.0659** -0.093*** -0.0756** 
 (0.022) (0.024) (0.024) 
Population size 1.640*** 1.890*** 1.895*** 
 (0.344) (0.381) (0.385) 
GDP per capita (log) -1.746*** -1.963*** -2.003*** 
 (0.498) (0.528) (0.530) 
Inflation (log) -0.526*** -0.479** -0.459** 
 (0.146) (0.147) (0.146) 
Foreign direct investment 0.144*** 0.131** 0.141** 
 (0.038) (0.048) (0.045) 
Ethnic polarization 0.354 0.171 0.0531 
 (0.688) (0.766) (0.708) 
Number of observations 478 449 449 
Number of countries 18 17 17 
Rho 0.138 0.171+ 0.143 
Q 0.00495 0.0117 0.00814 
J 2.366 5.249 3.654 
in log-odd units; robust standard errors in parentheses (adjusted for clustering by coun-
try); Just-identified GMM estimation. 
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These findings are in line with our expectations. As for the composition 
of the legislative coalition, the models tell us that the odds of antigov-
ernment protests are not meaningfully influenced by the size of the pres-
idential party within the governing coalition. However, the number of 
coalition parties is negatively related to the number of antigovernment 
protests – that is, all else being equal, the risk of antigovernment protests 
decreases as the number of political parties included in the coalition 
increases.  
To see whether the relationship between the size of the legislative 
coalition and the number of protest events varies with the number of 
parties included in the coalition, I include interaction terms in model 3. 
However, none of these interaction terms achieves statistical signifi-
cance. One obvious question is whether the relationship between legisla-
tive coalition size and the likelihood of antigovernment protests is condi-
tional on the performance of the economy. To assess this, I include 
interaction terms between the economic growth rate and coalition size in 
model 4. However, none of these interaction terms is statistically signifi-
cant. 
It might be possible that the above regression results are influenced 
by high-leverage cases like Brazil, where oversized coalitions have been 
the most frequent (see Table 1). Therefore, models 5 and 6 exclude ob-
servations from Brazil. As can be seen, none of the variables related to 
the composition of the legislative coalition has a statistically significant 
influence on the odds of antigovernment protests. Hence, this finding is 
not robust. However, model 6 once again confirms that there is a U-
shaped relationship between the size of the legislative coalition and the 
likelihood of antigovernment protests. The minimum threshold is 55 
percent of the seats in the assembly. The models 5 and 6 also indicate 
that the relationship between the size of the coalition and the occurrence 
of antigovernment protests does not vary with the party composition of 
the legislative coalition or the economic growth rate.  
As for control variables, all models tell us that the odds of antigov-
ernment protests are not statistically related to presidents’ formal pow-
ers, the reelection of presidents, the number of years presidents have 
been in office, the presence of left-wing and center-left presidents, or the 
ideological distance between presidents’ parties and the largest opposi-
tion parties in national assemblies. However, the models do indicate that 
there is a positive relationship between the likelihood of antigovernment 
protests and the size of the population, the number of Internet users, 
and the ratio of foreign direct investment to GDP. These findings are 
consistent with previous findings linking the incidence of antigovern-
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ment protests in Latin America to the effects of globalization and ne-
oliberalism (Arce and Bellinger 2007; Arce 2008; Arce and Rice 2009; 
Stahler-Sholk, Vanden, and Kuecker 2008; Almeida 2010) and the spread 
of social media (Salzman 2015). It can also be seen that the odds of an-
tigovernment protests are negatively associated with the economic 
growth rate, the inflation rate,13 economic development levels, and in-
come inequality. 
Overall, statistical results confirm that presidential coalition size in 
the national assembly affects the odds of antigovernment protests in 
Latin America. As hypothesized, the relationship between the size of the 
coalition and the odds of protest events are nonlinearly related. More 
specifically, the likelihood of antigovernment protests decreases until the 
president has a coalition comprising 50–55 percent of members of the 
national assembly; after this point, the odds of antigovernment protests 
increase as the size of the legislative coalition increases. Interestingly, 
after excluding the case of Brazil, this curvilinear relationship is not con-
ditional on the party composition of the legislative coalition. The evi-
dence thus confirms that there is a U-shaped relationship between legis-
lative coalition size and the odds of antigovernment protests. According-
ly, antigovernment protests are more likely to occur when presidents 
command minorities or oversized majorities in their national assemblies. 
To put it differently, protests against national governments are less likely 
to occur in countries where there is a balanced distribution of power 
between the president and the parties in the legislature and where there is 
give and take between both branches of government in the formulation 
and adoption of policy. This relationship holds independent of the num-
ber of parties that make up the coalition. 
5 Conclusion  
Most studies on Latin American presidentialism treat the incidence of 
antigovernment protests as an exogenous variable that influences the 
character of executive–legislative relations. In effect, social protests can 
be successful in influencing policymaking, changing the composition of 
government, and even shaping political institutions themselves. Howev-
er, this study tests whether the relationship can be influenced in the oth-
er direction – namely, whether the ways in which Latin American presi-
                                                 
13  This result should not be surprising considering that during the first decade of 
the twenty-first century, economic growth was paralleled by rising inflation 
rates in South American countries.  
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dents relate to parties in their national assemblies affect the incidence of 
antigovernment protests in their democracies. The statistical results here 
confirm that the incidence of antigovernment protest is affected by legis-
lative coalition size in the national assembly. Moreover, the findings 
indicate that there is a U-shaped association between antigovernment 
protest rates and legislative coalition size. More specifically, the odds of 
antigovernment protests decrease until the president’s coalition compris-
es 50–55 percent of the legislature; after which, the odds of antigovern-
ment protests increase as the legislative coalition grows.  
This finding holds after controlling for the number of parties com-
posing the legislative coalition. These results are robust to (1) the exclu-
sion of Brazil, where oversized majorities have been the most predomi-
nant, and (2) the inclusion of a series of socioeconomic and demographic 
controls. Interestingly, the curvilinear relationship between coalition size 
and the risk of antigovernment protests is not conditional on party com-
position of legislative coalitions or economic performance. These results 
are in line with previous findings on nonlinear relationships between 
governments’ legislative passage rates and social unrest (Saeigh 2011; 
2015) and between presidential powers and citizens’ support for and 
satisfaction with democracy (Singh and Carlin 2014). Overall, the find-
ings of this study highlight the role of checks and balances in counteract-
ing the incidence of antigovernment protests in Latin American presi-
dential systems. More research is needed on the links between political 
institutions and political participation in these democracies.  
Of course, there may be many counterarguments to the claims ad-
vanced here. Further studies may wish to test the findings of this study 
by developing alternative hypotheses, employing formal models, or using 
additional or alternative data. Future research should also corroborate 
whether the findings obtained here can be generalized to presidential 
systems in other parts of the world. The analysis can also be extended to 
the subnational level in federal democracies, such as Mexico, Brazil, and 
Argentina. An interesting line of inquiry would be to analyze the role of 
the judiciary and comptroller and ombudsman agencies. Qualitative data 
can help to shed further light on the relationship between antigovern-
ment protests and the character of executive–legislative relations. Schol-
ars could also explore how executive–legislative relations affect other 
forms of political participation, such as voting. The results of these fu-
ture undertakings will certainly provide a clearer theoretical and empirical 
understanding of the mechanisms through which executive–legislative 
relations influence political participation in presidential democracies in 
Latin America and beyond.  
  Legislative Coalition Size and Antigovernment Protests in LA 113
 

 
References 
Almeida, P. (2010), Social Movement Partyism: Collective Action and 
Oppositional Political Parties, in: N. Van Dyke and H. J. McCam-
mon (eds), Strategic Alliances. Coalition Building and Social Movements, 
London: University of Minnesota Press, 170–196. 
Almeida, P. (2007), Defensive Mobilization: Popular Movements Against 
Economic Adjustment Policies in Latin America, in: Latin American 
Perspectives, 34, 3, 123–139. 
Amorim Neto, O. (2006), The Presidential Calculus: Executive Policy 
Making and Cabinet Formation in the Americas, in: Comparative 
Political Studies, 39, 415–440. 
Arce, M. (2010), Parties and Social Protest in Latin America’s Neoliberal 
Era, in: Party Politics, 16, 5, 669–686. 
Arce, M. (2008), The Repoliticization of Collective Action After Neo-
liberalism in Peru, in: Latin American Politics and Society, 50, 3, 37–62. 
Arce, M., and P. T. Bellinger (2007), Low Intensity Democracy Revisited: 
The Effects of Economic Liberalization on Political Activity in 
Latin America, in: World Politics, 60, 1, 97–121. 
Arce, M., and W. Kim (2011), Globalization and Extra-Parliamentary 
Politics in an Era of Democracy, in: European Political Science Review, 
3, 2, 253–278. 
Arce, M., and R. Rice (2009), Societal Protest in Post Stabilization 
Bolivia, in: Latin American Research Review, 44, 1, 88–101. 
Bellinger, P. T., and M. Arce (2010), Protest and Democracy in Latin 
America’s Market Era, in: Political Research Quarterly, XX, X, 1–17. 
Blundell, R. W., R. Griffith, and F. Windmeijer (2002), Individual Effects 
and Dynamics in Count Data Models, in: Journal of Econometrics, 102, 
113–131. 
Camerlo, M., and A. Pérez-Liñán (2013), Minister Turnover, Critical Events, 
and the Electoral Calendar in Presidential Democracies, Instituto de 
Ciências Sociais da Universidade de Lisboa, Lisbon: Universidade 
de Lisboa. 
Cameron, A. C., and P. Trivedi (1998), Regression Analysis of Count Data, 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Canache, D. (2004), Urban Poor and Political Order, in: J. L. McCoy and 
D. J. Myers (eds), The Unraveling of Representative Democracy in Vene-
zuela, Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 33–48. 
Carreras, M. (forthcoming), Presidential Institutions and Electoral 
Participation in Concurrent Elections in Latin America, in: Political 
Studies. 
  114 Ana Isabel López García 
 
Chasquetti, D. (2001), Democracia, multipartidismo y coaliciones en 
América Latina: Evaluando la difícil combinación, in: J. Lanzaro 
(ed.), Tipos de presidencialismo y coaliciones en América Latina, Buenos 
Aires: CLACSO, 319–359, online: <http://biblioteca.clacso.edu. 
ar/clacso/gt/20101028021442/11chasquetti.pdf> (10 November 
2017). 
Cheibub, J. A. (2002), Minority Governments, Deadlock Situations, and 
the Survival of Presidential Democracies, in: Comparative Political 
Studies, 35, 3, 284–313. 
Cheibub, J. A., and F. Limongi (2002), Democratic Institutions and 
Regime Survival: Parliamentary and Presidential Democracies 
Reconsidered, in: Annual Review of Political Sciences, 5, 151–179. 
Cheibub, J. A., A. Przeworski, and S. M. Saiegh (2004), Government 
Coalitions and Legislative Success Under Presidentialism and 
Parliamentarism, in: British Journal of Political Science, 34, 565–587. 
Corrales, J. (2011), Why Polarize? Advantages and Disadvantages of a 
Rational-Choice Analysis of Government-Opposition Relations in 
Venezuela, in: J. Eastwood and T. Ponniah (eds), Revolution in 
Venezuela, Harvard: Harvard University Press, 67–97. 
Corrales, J. (2003), Power Asymmetries and Post-Pact Stability: Revisiting and 
Updating the Venezuelan Case, conference paper prepared for APSA, 
Philadelphia. 
Corrales, J., and M. Penfold (2011), Dragon in the Tropics Hugo Chavez and 
the Political Economy of Revolution in Venezuela, Washington, D.C.: 
Brookings Institution Press. 
Davis, D. E. (1999), The Power of Distance: Re-Theorizing Social 
Movements in Latin America, in: Theory and Society, 28, 4, 585–638, 
online: <www.jstor.org/stable/3108563?seq=1#page_scan_tab_ 
contents> (10 November 2017). 
Deheza, G. I. (1997), Gobiernos de Coalicion en el Sistema Presidencial: America 
del Sur, Florence: European University Institute. 
Foweraker, J. (1998), Review Article: Institutional Design, Party Systems 
and Governability, in: British Journal of Political Science, 28, 651–676. 
Foweraker, J. (1995), Theorizing Social Movements, London: Pluto Press. 
Foweraker, J., and R. Krznaric (2002), The Uneven Performance of 
Third Wave Democracies: Electoral Politics and the Imperfect Rule 
of Law in Latin America, in: Latin American Politics and Society, 44, 
29–60, online: <http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.15 
48-2456.2002.tb00213.x/abstract> (10 November 2017). 
  Legislative Coalition Size and Antigovernment Protests in LA 115
 

 
Foweraker, J., and T. Landman (1997), Citizenship Rights and Social Move-
ments: A Comparative and Statistical Analysis, Oxford: Oxford Uni-
versity Press. 
GDELT (2014), Global Data on Events, Location and Tone Dataset, online: 
<http://gdeltproject.org/> (28 September 2017). 
Georgetown University (2012), Political Database of the Americas, 
Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University, online: <www.pdba.geo 
rgetown.edu/> (28 September 2017). 
Gurr, T. R. (1970), Why Men Rebel, Princeton: Center of International 
Studies - Princeton University Press. 
Hagopian, F. (1990), “Democracy by Undemocratic Means”? Elites, 
Political Pacts, and Regime Transition in Brazil, in: Comparative 
Political Studies, 23, 2, 147–170, online: <http://journals.sagepub. 
com/doi/abs/10.1177/0010414090023002001> (10 November 
2017). 
Helmke, G., and S. Levitsky (2006), Informal Institutions and Democracy. 
Lessons from Latin America, Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University 
Press. 
Hochstetler, K. (2006), Rethinking Presidentialism: Challenges and 
Presidential Falls in South America, in: Comparative Politics, 38, 4, 
July, 401–408. 
Landman, T., and M. Larizza (2009), Inequality and Human Rights: Who 
Controls What, When, and How, in: International Studies Quarterly, 53, 
3, 715–736. 
Lederman, D., N. V. Loayza, and R. R. Soares (2005), Accountability and 
Corruption: Political Institutions Matter, in: Economics and Politics, 17, 
1–35, online: <http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1468-
0343.2005.00145.x/abstract> (10 November 2017). 
Levitsky, S., and J. Loxton (2013), Populism and Competitive 
Authoritarianism in the Andes, in: Democratization, 20, 1, 107–136. 
Levitsky, S., and L. A. Way (2010), Why Democracy Needs a Level 
Playing Field, in: Journal of Democracy, 21, 1, January, 57–68. 
Linz, J., and A. Valenzuela (1994), The Failure of Presidential Democracy, 
Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press. 
Llanos, M., and L. Mainstentredet (2010), Presidential Breakdowns in Latin 
America, Causes and Outcomes of Executive Instability in Developing Democ-
racies, New York: Palgrave. 
Lucero, J. A. (2008), Struggles of Voice: The Politics of Indigenous Representation 
in the Andes, Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press. 
  116 Ana Isabel López García 
 
Mainwaring, S. (1993), Presidentialism, Multipartism, and Democracy: 
The Difficult Combination, in: Comparative Political Studies, 26, 2, 
July, 198–228. 
Marsteintredet, L., and E. Berntzen (2008), Reducing the Perils of 
Presidentialism in Latin America through Presidential Interruptions, 
in: Comparative Politics, 41, 1, October, 83–101. 
Martínez-Gallardo, C. (2014), Designing Cabinets: Presidential Politics 
and Cabinet Instability in Latin America, in: Journal of Politics in Latin 
America, 6, 2, 3–38, online: <https://journals.sub.uni-hamburg.de/ 
giga/jpla/article/view/761/759> (28 September 2017). 
Mejía Acosta, A. (2006), Crafting Legislative Ghost Coalitions in 
Ecuador: Informal Institutions and Economic Reform in an 
Unlikely Case, in: G. Helmke and S. Levistky (eds), Informal Instit-
utions and Democracy: Lessons from Latin America, Baltimore: The Johns 
Hopkins University Press, 69–84. 
Mejía Acosta, A., and J. Polga-Hecimovich (2011), Coalition Erosion and 
Presidential Instability in Ecuador, in: Latin American Politics and 
Society, 53, 87–111. 
Montero, A. (2014), Brazil: Reversal of Fortune, London: Polity. 
Morgenstern, S., J. J. Negri, and A. Pérez-Liñán (2008), Parliamentary 
Opposition in Non-Parliamentary Regimes: Latin America, in: 
Journal of Legislative Studies, 14, 1, 160–189. 
Moseley, M. W. (2015), Contentious Engagement: Understandng Protest 
Participation in Latin American Democracies, in: Journal of Politics in 
Latin America, 7, 3, 3–48, online: <https://journals.sub.uni-ham 
burg.de/giga/jpla/article/view/899/906> (28 September 2017). 
Muller, E. N., and E. Weede (1994), Theories of Rebellion: Relative 
Deprivation and Power Contention, in: Rationality and Society, 6, 1, 
40–57. 
Negretto, G. L. (2013), Making Constitutions. Presidents, Parties, and Instituti-
onal Choice in Latin America, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Nolte, D., and A. Schilling-Vacaflor (2012), Introduction: The Times Are 
Changing: Constitutional Transformations in Latin America since 
the 1990s, in: D. Nolte and A. Schilling-Vacaflor (eds), New Con-
stitutionalism in Latin America. Promises and Practices, Surrey: Ashgate, 
3–30. 
O’Donnell, G. (2010), Democracy, Agency, and the State, New York: Oxford 
University Press. 
O’Donnell, G. (1994), Delegative Democracy, in: Journal of Democracy, 5, 
January, 55–69. 
  Legislative Coalition Size and Antigovernment Protests in LA 117
 

 
Oliveros, V., M. Vaishnav, and M. V. Murillo (2009), Latin American 
Electoral Dataset (1978–2009), online: <https://mariavictoriamurillo. 
com/data/> (29 September 2017). 
Payne, M., D. Zovatto, and M. Mateo Díaz (2006), La politica importa. 
Democracia y desarrollo en America Latina, Washington D.C.: Inter-
American Development Bank - IDEA. 
Pérez Liñán, A. (2008), Instituciones, coaliciones callejeras e inestabilidad 
política: Perspectivas teóricas sobre las crisis presidenciales, in: 
América Latina Hoy, 49, 105–216. 
Raile, E. D., C. Pereira, and T. J. Power (2010), The Executive Toolbox: 
Building Legislative Support in a Multiparty Presidential Regime, in: 
Political Research Quarterly, 64, 2, 323–334, online: <http://journals. 
sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/1065912909355711> (10 Novem-
ber 2017). 
Salzman, R. (2015), Exploring Social Media Use and Protest Particip-
ation in Latin America, in: Journal of Latin American Communication 
Research, 5, 2, 72–85. 
Singh, S. P., and R. E. Carlin (2015), Happy Medium, Happy Citizens: 
Presidential Power and Democratic Regime Support, in: Political 
Research Quarterly, 68, 1, 3–17. 
Solt, F. (2014), The Standardized World Income Inequality Dataset, in: 
Social Science Quarterly, 97, 1267–1281, online: <http://onlinelibrary. 
wiley.com/doi/10.1111/ssqu.12295/abstract> (10 November 
2017). 
Stepan, A., and C. Skach (1993), Constitutional Frameworks and Demo-
cratic Consolidation: Parliamentalism versus Presidentialism, in: 
World Politics, 46, 1–22. 
Sutradhar, B. C. (2011), Dynamic Mixed Models for Familial Longitudinal 
Data, London: Springer. 
Tilly, C. (1978), Social Movements and National Politics, Center for Research 
on Social Organization. 
Trivedi, P., and M. Munkin (2010), Models, Recent Developments in 
Cross Section and Panel Count, in: Handbook of Empirical Economics 
and Finance, Chapman and Hall/CRC, December, 87–131, online: 
<www.crcpress.com/Handbook-of-Empirical-Economics-and-
Finance/Ullah-Giles/p/book/9781138113664> (10 November 
2017). 
Winters, M. S., and R. Weitz-Shapiro (2015), Political Corruption and 
Partisan Engagement: Evidence from Brazil, in: Journal of Politics in 
Latin America, 7, 1, 45–81, online: <https://journals.sub.uni-ham 
burg.de/giga/jpla/article/view/821/822> (28 September 2017). 
  118 Ana Isabel López García 
 
Wooldridge, J. M. (2010), Econometric Analysis of Cross Section and Panel 
Data, Cambridge: The MIT Press. 
World Bank (2014), World Development Indicators, Washington, D.C.: The 
World Bank. 
Yashar, D. (2005), Contesting Citizenship in Latin America: The Rise of 
Indigenous Movements and the Postliberal Challenge, Cambridge: Cam-
bridge University Press. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Coaliciones Legislativas y Protestas Antigubernamentales en Amé-
rica Latina 
Resumen: Este trabajo analiza si el tamaño y la composición de las 
coaliciones legislativas son factores adicionales en la incidencia de protes-
tas en contra de los gobiernos nacionales de América Latina. Con base 
en datos agregados de 18 democracias de la región para el período 1980-
2014, este estudio demuestra que la relación entre el tamaño de la coali-
ción gubernamental en (la cámara baja de) la legislatura nacional y la 
probabilidad de protestas antigubernamentales tiene una forma de U. 
Específicamente, la probabilidad de protestas antigubernamentales dis-
minuye hasta que el presidente cuenta con una coalición del tamaño de 
50-55 por ciento de la asamblea nacional; después de este punto, la pro-
babilidad de protestas aumenta a medida que crece el tamaño de la coali-
ción. Este resultado es válido aún después de controlar por la composi-
ción partidista de la coalición, así como otros factores que estudios ante-
riores han vinculado con la incidencia de protestas antigubernamentales. 
La evidencia indica que tanto las minorías como las supermajorías legisla-
tivas pueden ser socialmente desestabilizadoras para las democracias 
latinoamericanas. 
Palabras clave: América Latina, relaciones ejecutivo-legislativo, presi-
dencialismo, participación política, protestas antigubernamentales  
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Appendix 
Socioeconomic and Demographic Variables 
Population size is the number of residents of a country (World Bank 
2014). It is included because the number of protests in a given country 
and year is positively related to the size of the population. The logarithm 
of this variable is included in the models.  
GDP per capita is the gross domestic product (GDP) in constant 
2005 US dollars divided by midyear population (World Bank 2014). This 
is controlled for because as individuals receive better incomes and educa-
tion, they become better informed about politics and are therefore more 
likely to become interested in and participate in politics, either through 
voting or other extrainstitutional channels like protests (Brady, Verba, 
and Scholzman 1995). The logarithm of this variable is included in all 
models. 
Ethnic polarization is included in order to control for antigovern-
ment protests that are motivated by the relative segregation or marginali-
zation of ethnic groups (Yashar 2005). It is measured as an index that 
ranges from 0 to 1, with 1 being the bipolar case in which the population 
is equally split into two ethnic groups of equal size (Montalvo and Reyn-
al-Querol 2005). 
GDP growth is included in order to account for protests motivated 
by economic downturns. It is registered as the annual percentage GDP 
growth at market prices based on constant 2005 US dollars (World Bank 
2014). 
Inflation, as well as economic growth, is considered in order to con-
trol for the rise of protests that are mainly motivated by economic hard-
ship. It is measured as the annual growth rate of the GDP implicit defla-
tor (World Bank 2014). The logarithm of this variable is included in all 
models. 
Income inequality is included in order to control for antigovern-
ment protests that are motivated by the relative deprivation of groups in 
society based on the distribution of income. It is measured using the 
Gini index for net income inequality index (Solt 2014). It ranges from 0 
to 100, with 100 being the case of perfect inequality.  
Internet users per 100 people is registered as the number of indi-
viduals who access the Internet in a given year (World Bank 2014). It is 
used to control for the impact of growing Internet usage on the devel-
opment of social networks, information sources, collective action, and 
protest events (Salzman 2015).  
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Foreign direct investment is the net inflows of capital from foreign 
investors divided by the GDP (World Bank 2014). It is included as a 
proxy of the degree of economic liberalization achieved in a country. 
Therefore, it serves a control for those protests that are motivated by 
privatization or the entry of foreign companies or entities in the econo-
my (Arce and Bellinger 2007; Arce 2008; Arce and Rice 2009; Stahler-
Sholk, Vanden, and Kuecker 2008; Almeida 2010). 
 
 
 
